NHS Media conducted an interview with Ms. Sitara Noor, a Fellow with Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. During the interview, the topic of Strategic Stability in South Asia was discussed.
Key Points
- The exploration of Strategic Stability in South Asia underscored its inherently dynamic nature, revealing how ongoing competition between India and Pakistan complicates the pursuit of enduring stability.
- Analysis of the essential components crucial for stability—First Strike, Crisis, and Arms Race Stability—exposed their current destabilized status within the South Asian context.
- Third-party involvement’s significance in managing crises has a pivotal role, while excessive reliance on such interventions has potential risks.
Replying to the question of whether there exists Strategic Stability in South Asia? Ms. Noor emphasized that Strategic Stability is not merely an end goal, but rather a dynamic process. She pointed to the evolving situation between India and Pakistan, characterizing it as a competition. To assess whether Strategic Stability has been achieved, it is imperative to first comprehend its essence. In the context of nuclear dimensions, Strategic Stability pertains to a nation’s capacity to retaliate effectively subsequent to absorbing an initial strike. This entails the establishment of mutual vulnerability between the two states, ensuring neither party can launch a first strike. Fundamental to this is the shared understanding that employing nuclear weaponry against each other is impermissible, thereby fostering Strategic Stability. She further analyzed three essential elements that contribute to Strategic Stability:
- First Strike Stability: This denotes a scenario where a state refrains from launching the first strike. During the Cold War, elements of First Strike Stability were achieved between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- Crisis Stability: This element closely aligns with the first, involving the absence of incentives for a nuclear first strike.
- Arms Race Stability: This implies the absence of an arms race dynamic.
When these three elements are applied to the situation in South Asia, it becomes evident that they are currently in a state of destabilization.
Regarding India’s attack on Balakot and the international community’s response, Ms. Noor underscored the significant impact of such behavior. The potential for increased volatility arises when the international community either remains silent or supports such actions. This can exacerbate crises considerably.
Addressing the role of third parties in South Asian stability, Sitara Noor emphasized its significance. Throughout various crises between India and Pakistan, third-party involvement played a vital role in stabilizing the situation. However, she cautioned against overreliance on this mechanism, given the varying nature of third-party intervention. Ms Noor cited the 2019 Pulwama crisis as a clear example where the absence of an effective escalation control mechanism led to increased tensions between the two nations.
Analyzing the influence of US-China competition on India and its impact on Pakistan, Ms. Noor highlighted the substantial disparity in defense spending between the two neighboring countries. India’s defense budget far exceeds Pakistan’s, rendering it challenging Pakistan to match India’s conventional military strength. She stressed that Pakistan’s nuclear program was initiated in response to this conventional asymmetry, decreasing the likelihood of nuclear weapon use.
Considering the India-China competition, Ms. Noor viewed India as a net beneficiary due to its strategic agreements and acquisitions from the US. However, she noted the asymmetric security situations between India and China versus India and Pakistan. Economic interdependence between India and China serves as a deterrence factor which is absent in India-Pakistan relations. Nevertheless, India’s acquisitions against China can destabilize the India-Pakistan equation, reinforcing Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear weapons.
Discussing the impact of emerging technologies on the balance of terror, Ms. Noor underscored the ongoing debate around nuclear technology advancement. Both India and Pakistan are in their nascent stages of competing in this realm, including cyber and lethal atomic technologies. She cautioned against employing lethal atomic weapons, as doing so would redefine the rules and norms of warfare. The pursuit of cyber capabilities introduces another layer of insecurity in strategic stability.
Regarding the number of nuclear weapons, Ms. Noor acknowledged the debate over estimates provided by various institutions. While both India and Pakistan debate the accuracy of these estimates, the underlying concern is the expansion of their respective nuclear arsenals. She emphasized India’s potential shift toward counterforce strikes, necessitating a substantial increase in nuclear assets. This evolving nuclear landscape raises questions about Pakistan’s response and the changing dynamics of India’s strategic culture.
When asked about India’s reluctance to engage in talks, Ms. Noor referenced the 2012 Secretary-level talks that did not yield progress. She attributed India’s reluctance to its limited approach to terrorism, despite terrorism being a mutual concern for both nations. She stressed the need for innovative engagement methods and the importance of sharing information at the DGMO level. Additionally, she proposed revisiting the concept of strategic restraint, involving nuclear and missile restraint, conventional restraint, and mechanisms for addressing outstanding issues, as critical steps for fostering stability between India and Pakistan.